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AN UNFORTUNATE REVERSAL OF FORTUNE:

TIE SUPREME COURT'S NARROWING OF

TILE AmERIcANs WITH DisABIATEs ACT
By Barry C. Taylor*

"While passing state laws will
correct some of the
problematic Supreme Court
decisions, it sadly marks the
return to a patchwork of laws
protecting some people with
disabilities more than others
depending on where they
happen to live."

* Barry C. Taylor is the Legal Advocacy Director of
Equip for Equality, the protection and advocacy system
in Illinois, which provides free legal advocacy and
education services.
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Congress passed the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") in
V V 1990, the stated purpose of the law
was to provide a "clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. 12101(b)(1). Passage
of the ADA was the culmination of many years
of effort and advocacy by the disability
community to implement a federal standard for
enforcing and protecting the rights of people with
disabilities, and to bring disability on par with
the civil rights protections for other protected
classes. Thirteen years after the enactment of
the ADA, the United States Supreme Court has
effectively rolled back many of the Act's
protections by narrowly construing some of the
Act's most vital components.
While a few of the Supreme Court's
ADA decisions actually have been favorable to
people with disabilities,' most have resulted in
significant and serious limitations on the
opportunities for people with disabilities to obtain
redress for discriminatory treatment. This has
been particularly true in cases involving the
employment rights of people with disabilities
where the Court has consistently upheld the
interests of business at the expense of people
with disabilities. The Court has lost sight of the
ADA's underlying purpose, and disregarded its
carefully laid out legislative history by
implementing regulations depriving many people
with disabilities of the law's promised equal
opportunity.
This article will examine the ADA's
history, review defendants' strategies to limit the
application of the ADA, discuss the Supreme
Court's restrictive interpretation of the ADA, and
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explore what the future holds for the ADA and
the civil rights of people with disabilities.

When

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ADA
Congress enacted the major

federal civil rights laws in the 1960s

protecting people from discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, age,
gender and religion, no comparable federal civil
rights legislation was passed for people with
disabilities. This inequity began to change in the

1970s when Congress passed the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. However, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act only prohibited disability

percentage of plaintiffs were deemed ineligible
under the Act. Defendants rarely challenged
whether someone had a "handicap" as defined
by Section 504. Rather, most cases focused on
whether the person was qualified or whether the
adverse action taken by the defendant was
actually in response to the plaintiff's disability.
Shortly before the passage of the ADA,
the Supreme Court decided School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)
under Section 504. Arline was an employment
discrimination case brought by a teacher with
tuberculosis, and the Court took an expansive
view of coverage under Section 504.

discrimination by
entities receiving

Accordingly, when
the ADA was being
drafted, Congress
Swas urged to adopt
Section
504's
definition of disability
in order to incorporate into the ADA
the Rehabilitation
Act's favorable
jurisprudence of the
lower courts and the
Supreme Court.2
The drafters
of the ADA made

federal funding.
Thus, its reach was
relatively limited,
since it did not
cover many common areas of
disability discrimination, including
discrimination by
private employers.
When the

ADA was finally
passed in 1990, it
was
closely

clear that Congress
intended states to be

modeled on Sec-

tion 504. In fact,
the definition of disability under the ADA is
identical to the definition of "handicap" under
Section 504:
(A) A physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual;
(B) A record of such an impairment; or
(C) Being regarded as having such an
impairment

42 U.S.C. 12102(2).
Since its passage, courts have liberally
construed who is covered under the Rehabilitation
Act. In fact, over the years, only a small
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covered by the
ADA by explicitly abrogating state sovereign
immunity. Additionally, Congress was careful not
to substantially expand the Rehabilitation Act's
remedies when passing the ADA in order to
prevent future claims that the ADA's remedies
were not congruent and proportional, and thus
subject to a constitutional challenge. Congress
heard wide-ranging testimony in order to establish
a rich and clear legislative history. As will be
discussed below, the Supreme Court has
completely disregarded Congress' intent by
invalidating the ADA's application to state
employers.
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Because

DEFENSE STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINTHEH

ADA

the Rehabilitation Act's

discrimination provisions are limited to
only those entities receiving federal
funding, the defense bar was not particularly
motivated to develop a coordinated strategy to
defeat plaintiff claims under Section 504.
However, once the ADA was passed, the
universe of defendants expanded substantially to
include all private businesses open to the public,
and all employers with 15 or more employees.
As a result, defendants began to aggressively
challenge whether certain plaintiffs were even
covered by the ADA. Similarly, state attorneys
general began to develop strategies to challenge
the constitutionality of the ADA and its application
to the states as a way to avoid liability.
Regrettably for plaintiffs, numerous
courts, including the Supreme Court, have been
very receptive to these arguments. As a result
plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in a high
percentage of ADA cases, often failing to get
past the initial determination of whether they have
an ADA disability.
Plaintiffs who sue for discrimination
based on race, national origin, age and gender
do not have to spend significant resources
proving that they are within a protected class,
and instead can focus primarily on the underlying
acts of discrimination. However, because of the
aggressive assault on the ADA by defendants,
ADA plaintiffs have become mired in a hypertechnical analysis of eligibility and jurisdiction,
often resulting in the court never even reviewing
the defendant's purported discriminatory conduct.
Clearly, these developments are contrary to
Congress' intent that the ADA be viewed
expansively, and ignore the long line of favorable
precedents established under the Rehabilitation
Act.
THE SUPREME COURT EMBRACES A NARROW

Among

CONSTRUCTION OF THE ADA

the ADA cases the Supreme

Court has decided, four have been
particularly detrimental to the rights

PAGE 3
Published by LAW eCommons, 2003

of people with disabilities: Sutton v. United
Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999),
Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001),
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), and
Toyota Motor Manufacturingv. Williams, 534
U.S. 184 (2002). The following is a discussion
of how these decisions have negatively impacted
the ADA, as well as potential claims under other
civil rights statutes.
Sutton v. United Airlines
The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton
was the first clear evidence that the Court intended
to narrowly construe provisions of the ADA. 3
In Sutton, the Court faced the question of
whether medication or assistive devices used by
people with disabilities had to be taken into

"The Court found that the ADA
would cover 160 million
Americans if it included people
who mitigate their disability, a
result not intended by Congress.
account when determining whether a person was
substantially limited in a major life activity. The
legislative history and subsequent federal
regulations are extremely clear that Congress
intended that mitigating measures should not be
part of the analysis for ADA eligibility.
At the time the Supreme Court decided
Sutton, eight federal Courts of Appeals had
concluded that mitigating measures should not
be included in the analysis ofADAeligibility, but
instead should only be considered when
evaluating whether a person was qualified under
the ADA. Otherwise, people with disabilities
could be put in the untenable position of deciding
whether to use a mitigating measure or be
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covered by the ADA. However, the Tenth Circuit
in Sutton took the opposite view creating a split
of authority in the circuits, and the Supreme Court
grantedcertiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth
Circuit's decision holding that plaintiffs must be
viewed in their mitigated state when determining
eligibility under the ADA. The Court reasoned
that it did not need to look at the legislative history
on this issue because the statutory text made it
clear that mitigating measures must be taken into
account. The Court relied on the fact that the
language of the statute (i.e. "substantially limits")
is in the present tense indicating that it applies to
people as they currently are in the real world,
not as they might appear if they did not mitigate
their impairments.4 The Court also relied heavily
on the preamble of the ADA, which states that
there are 43 million Americans with disabilities.
The Court found that the ADA would cover 160
million Americans if it included people who
mitigate their disabilities, a result not intended by
Congress.s
The Court's reliance on the reference to
43 million people as a basis for Congress' intent
is sorely misplaced and is not supported by those
who drafted the statute,6 by the ADA's primary
sponsor,' or by the federal agency that
recommended the enactment of the ADA.' The
Court's reasoning wrongly assumes that
Congress sought to place some sort of numeric
eligibility "cap" on theADA. The Court's refusal
to actually determine the clear intent of Congress
by reviewing the legislative history leads to the
absurd result that disability groups that historically
have been discriminated against most (e.g. people
with epilepsy and mental illness), and thus, most
in need of the ADA's protection, may not be
covered by the law because of new drugs that
help mitigate the symptoms of the disability.
Board of Trustees for the University of
Alabama v. Garrett
In addition to construing key terms of
the ADA very narrowly, the Supreme Court has
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also limited the scope of the ADA with respect
to employment discrimination cases against the
State. The Supreme Court ruled in Garrettthat
employment discrimination suits in federal court
by state employees to recover money damages
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The
Court held that although Congress clearly
intended states to be subject to ADA employment
discrimination suits, the ADA's legislative record
failed to sufficiently show that Congress identified
a history and pattern of irrational employment
discrimination by the states against people with

disabilities.
After Garrett, state employers are no
longer subject to private, federal ADA
employment discrimination suits seeking money
damages. As a result, employees with disabilities
working for the state have fewer civil rights
protections than employees with disabilities
working for private or local governmental
employers. Although state employees with
disabilities can still bring ADA claims against state
officials for injunctive relief, one of the ADA's
strongest remedies and deterrents (i.e. money
damages) has been jettisoned by the Supreme
Court.
Garrettis just the latest in a series of
Supreme Court decisions during the last several
years restricting plaintiffs' ability to sue states
under federal law.9 The Court's decisions
invalidating civil rights enforcement against the
states demonstrate an antipathy by the Court
toward Congress' stated intent to enact
comprehensive remedial civil rights legislation that
applies to the states. In its current term, the
Supreme Court will review the constitutionality
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, as well as
Title II of the ADA, which covers state and local
government services."o Thus, it appears likely
that the Court will continue its systematic rollback
of Congress' efforts to protect the civil rights of
people with disabilities and other protected
classes.
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Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human
Services
Just three months after Garrett, the
Supreme Court issued another ADA decision that
undermined the civil rights of people with
disabilities and those covered by other civil rights
laws. In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court
eliminated the "catalyst theory" as a basis for
obtaining attorney's fees as a prevailing party.
The catalyst theory is a longstanding doctrine that
allows a plaintiff to be a prevailing party for
purposes of fee-shifting statutes if the plaintiff
achieves the result sought in the litigation even if
the result was due to a voluntary change in the
defendant's conduct caused by the litigation.
Plaintiff's attorney's frequently sought and

"The Court's requirement that
plaintiffs must now prove that the
major life activity is central to
"most people's lives" imposes a
new objective standard that may
require plaintiffs to introduce
expert social science or vocational
testimony."
successfully obtained attorneys fees under the
catalyst theory.
Without the ability to obtain attorney's
fees for "voluntary" changes made in response
to litigation, many plaintiffs may be unable to
secure legal counsel to litigate civil rights cases.
This is of particular concern to people with
disabilities, who are often poor and will now be
less likely to retain an attorney because of the
risk that a defendant will unilaterally moot a case
before judgment to avoid paying attorney's fees.
Prior to Buckhannon, nine of the Circuit
Courts of Appeal had long embraced the catalyst
theory. As in Sutton, the Supreme Court's
decision in Buckhannon was contrary to an
overwhelming majority of decisions by Circuit
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Courts of Appeal. The Supreme Court's
elimination of the catalyst theory has resulted in a
dramatic change in the landscape of civil rights
litigation, and some lower courts are exploring
extending Buckhannon beyond the ADA to
other civil rights laws including the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act."
Toyota Manufacturing v. Williams
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided
Toyota Manufacturing v. Williams, another
ADA employment discrimination case, and
continued to limit the scope of the Act making it
even more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed. In
Williams, the plaintiff had carpal tunnel syndrome
and sought reasonable accommodations under
the ADA. The accommodations were denied,
and ultimately, she was fired. The Supreme Court
found that the plaintiff did not have an ADA
disability, and therefore, was not entitled to the
protections of the Act.
The Court stated that plaintiffs who claim
to be covered by the ADA because they are
substantially limited in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks must be able to show
that these limitations are for activities that are
central to "most people's lives."l 2 The Court
essentially created a new standard not supported
by the text of the ADA, which only requires
plaintiffs to show a "substantial limitation in a major
life activity of such individual."l3 (emphasis
added). The Court's requirement that plaintiffs
must now prove that the major life activity is
central to "most people's lives" imposes a new
objective standard that may require plaintiffs to
introduce expert social science or vocational
testimony. Requiring plaintiffs to expend
additional litigation costs and resources will surely
adversely affect the ability of people with
disabilities to adequately enforce their rights under
the ADA.
The Court also stated that the elements
of the definition of disability "need to be
interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled." 14 The strict
construction standard articulated by the Court in
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WHAT CAN BE DONE IN RESPONSE TO THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS?

he Supreme Court's ADA decisions
have not eliminated the ability of people
with disabilities to combat disability
discrimination, and for some plaintiffs the ADA
continues to be an important and effective tool.
However, the cases highlighted above have
certainly made the playing field much more
favorable to defendants.
Many disability advocates have
concluded that amending the ADA or enacting
new legislation may be the only way to halt the
Supreme Court's systematic dismantling of the
Act. Historically, disability advocates were
extremely wary to "open up" the ADA
legislatively fearing that Congress would use the
opportunity to make the law even more
restrictive. However, in light of the Supreme
Court's restricted interpretations of the ADA, as
well as the Court's consistent criticism of
Congress that the ADA's language is vague, it
appears that a legislative fix may be the best
option.
The National Council on Disability is
currently in the process of publishing a series of
policy briefs responding to the Supreme Court's
ADA decisions, and will soon be making specific
legislative proposals to address the problems
arising from the Supreme Court's decisions. One
example of a legislative solution can be seen in a
bill recently introduced in the Senate seeking to
undo the Supreme Court's elimination of the
catalyst theory in Buckhannon.
Another response to the Supreme
Court's decisions is for individual states to agree
to pass corrective legislation. For instance, in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Garrett,Minnesota passed legislation waiving
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sovereign immunity under the ADA and other civil
rights laws. 16 Sovereign immunity waiver
legislation similar to the Minnesota law is pending
in numerous other states. These laws would
allow people with disabilities to proceed with
ADA claims against the states despite the
Supreme Court's decision in Garrett. While
passing state laws will correct some of the
problematic Supreme Court decisions, it sadly
marks the return to a patchwork of laws
protecting some people with disabilities more
than others depending on where they happen to
live. This geographic inequity was one of the
main reasons the ADA was passed - i.e., to
provide a national standard and serves as a
reminder of how the Supreme Court has thwarted
the intent of Congress.
Other plaintiff attorneys are choosing to
rely on state and local disability laws instead of
the ADA when seeking redress for disability
discrimination because many of the laws have a
broader definition of disability. In these forums,
people with disabilities have a greater opportunity
for the alleged discrimination to be reviewed by
the trier of fact, instead of the sole focus being
whether a plaintiff is eligible under the law, which
has been the situation facing many ADAplaintiffs.
The legacy of the current Supreme Court
will surely include its ADA decisions that
significantly limited the ability of Congress to
provide a national standard for comprehensive
and remedial civil rights protection. Unfortunately,
this shameful legacy will be carried on the backs
of people with disabilities and people in other
protected classes.
1See, PennsylvaniaDep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S.
206 (1998), Bragdonv. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), and
L.C v. Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
a more thorough review of the history of the
passage of the ADA as well as a comprehensive
analysis of the ADA's disability definition, see Chai R.
Feldblum, Definition ofDisabilityUnderFederalAntiDiscriminationLaw: What Happened? Why? And
What Can We Do About It?, 21 Berkley J. of Empl.
2 For

&

Williams is an alarming departure from longstanding precedent that civil rights laws are to be
construed liberally to achieve their remedial
purposes. The potential ripple effect of the
Court's strict construction standard is certainly a
cause for serious concern.

Lab. L. 91 (2000).

Continued on Page 33.
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